A folk theorem for stochastic games with private almost-perfect monitoring

Katsuhiko Aiba

Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, vol. 86, issue C, 58-66

Abstract: We prove a folk theorem for stochastic games with private, almost-perfect monitoring and observable states when the limit set of feasible and individually rational payoffs is independent of the state. This asymptotic state independence holds, for example, for irreducible stochastic games. Our result establishes that the sophisticated construction of Hörner and Olszewski (2006) for repeated games can be adapted to stochastic games, reinforcing our conviction that much knowledge and intuition about repeated games carries over to the analysis of irreducible stochastic games.

Keywords: Stochastic games; Private monitoring; Folk theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:86:y:2014:i:c:p:58-66

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.007

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