A foundation for strategic agenda voting

Jose Apesteguia, Miguel Ballester and Yusufcan Masatlioglu

Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, vol. 87, issue C, 91-99

Abstract: We offer complete characterizations of the equilibrium outcomes of two prominent agenda voting institutions that are widely used in the democratic world: the amendment, also known as the Anglo-American procedure, and the successive, or equivalently the Euro-Latin procedure. Our axiomatic approach provides a proper understanding of these voting institutions, and allows comparisons between them, and with other voting procedures.

Keywords: Strategic voting; Agendas; Committees; Institutions; Axioms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D02 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Working Paper: A Foundation for Strategic Agenda Voting (2015)
Working Paper: A foundation for strategic agenda voting (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:87:y:2014:i:c:p:91-99

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.006

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