A Foundation for Strategic Agenda Voting

Yusufcan Masatlioglu, Miguel Ballester and Jose Apesteguia

No 607, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We offer complete characterizations of the equilibrium outcomes of two prominent agenda voting institutions that are widely used in the democratic world: the amendment, also known as the Anglo-American procedure, and the successive, or equivalently the Euro-Latin procedure. Our axiomatic approach provides a proper understanding of these voting institutions, and allows comparisons between them, and with other voting procedures.

Keywords: strategic voting; institutions; Committees; agendas; axioms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D02 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A foundation for strategic agenda voting (2014)
Working Paper: A foundation for strategic agenda voting (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:607

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