Coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts

Ines Macho-Stadler, David Perez-Castrillo and Nicolás Porteiro

Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, vol. 86, issue C, 145-164

Abstract: We study the length of agreements in a market in which infinitely-lived firms contract with agents that live for two periods. Firms differ in the expected values of their projects, as do workers in their abilities to manage projects. Worker effort is not contractible and worker ability is revealed during the relationship. The market dictates the trade-off between sorting and incentives. Short- and long-term contracts often coexist: The best firms always use short-term contracts to hire high-ability senior workers, firms with less profitable projects use short-term contracts to save on the cost of hiring junior workers, whereas intermediate firms use long-term agreements to provide better incentives to their workers. We relate our results to the optimal assignment literature that follows Becker (1973).

Keywords: Matching; Moral hazard; Contracts; Assignment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:86:y:2014:i:c:p:145-164

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.013

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