Intrinsic and instrumental reciprocity: An experimental study

Luis Cabral, Erkut Ozbay and Andrew Schotter

Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, vol. 87, issue C, 100-121

Abstract: In the context of an indefinitely repeated veto game, we devise an experiment to distinguish between alternative explanations of generous behavior (accepting negative payoffs): altruism, intrinsic backward-looking reciprocity, and instrumental forward-looking reciprocity. Our results are broadly consistent with the hypothesis that observed sacrifices are motivated by equilibrium selfish, forward-looking reciprocal behavior although we find a more subtle way in which past kindness affects behavior.

Keywords: Reciprocity; Indefinitely repeated games; Veto game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:87:y:2014:i:c:p:100-121

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.001

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