Universality of Nash components

Dieter Balkenborg and Dries Vermeulen

Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, vol. 86, issue C, 67-76

Abstract: We show that Nash equilibrium components are universal for the collection of connected polyhedral sets. More precisely for every polyhedral set we construct a so-called binary game—a game where all players have two pure strategies and a common utility function with values either zero or one—whose success set (the set of strategy profiles where the maximal payoff of one is indeed achieved) is homeomorphic to the given polyhedral set. Since compact semi-algebraic sets can be triangulated, a similar result follows for the collection of connected compact semi-algebraic sets.

Keywords: Strategic form games; Nash equilibrium; Nash component; Topology (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Universality of Nash Components (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:86:y:2014:i:c:p:67-76

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.010

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