Universality of Nash Components

Dieter Balkenborg and Dries Vermeulen

No 1205, Discussion Papers from University of Exeter, Department of Economics

Abstract: We show that Nash equilibrium components are universal for the collection of connected polyhedral sets. More precisely for every polyhedral set we construct a so-called binary game — a common interest game whose common payoff to the players is at most equal to one—whose success set (the set of strategy profiles where the maximal payoff of one is indeed achieved) is homeomorphic to the given polyhedral set. Since compact semi-algebraic sets can be triangulated, a similar result follows for the collection of connected compact semi-algebraic sets.

Keywords: Strategic form games; Nash equilibrium; Nash component; topology. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-hpe
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Journal Article: Universality of Nash components (2014)
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