Robust and secure implementation: equivalence theorems

Tsuyoshi Adachi

Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, vol. 86, issue C, 96-101

Abstract: This paper shows that in private value environments, strategy-proofness and the rectangular property are necessary conditions for (full) robust implementation (Bergemann and Morris, 2011). As corollaries, we obtain the equivalence between robust and secure implementation (Saijo et al., 2007), the revelation principle for robust implementation, and characterization of double implementation in robust and secure implementation.

Keywords: Robust implementation; Secure implementation; Private values; Full implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D78 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:86:y:2014:i:c:p:96-101

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.015

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