Mixed equilibria in runoff elections

Dimitrios Xefteris

Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, vol. 87, issue C, 619-623

Abstract: We demonstrate that the Hotelling–Downs model with runoff voting always admits symmetric mixed strategy equilibria for any (even or odd) number of office-motivated candidates (provided they are at least four). In specific, (a) we show that the game does not admit any symmetric atomless equilibrium, (b) we fully characterize a class of symmetric atomic mixed equilibria which exist for any distribution of the voters' ideal policies and (c) we argue that these equilibria are more robust than pure strategy equilibria to introduction of uncertainty about the voters' preferences.

Keywords: Runoff voting; Mixed strategies; Hotelling–Downs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 D03 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:87:y:2014:i:c:p:619-623

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.09.002

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