Judgment aggregation in search for the truth

İrem Bozbay, Franz Dietrich and Hans Peters

Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, vol. 87, issue C, 571-590

Abstract: We analyze the problem of aggregating judgments over multiple issues from the perspective of whether aggregate judgments manage to efficiently use all voters' private information. While new in judgment aggregation theory, this perspective is familiar in a different body of literature about voting between two alternatives where voters' disagreements stem from conflicts of information rather than of interest. Combining the two bodies of literature, we consider a simple judgment aggregation problem and model the private information underlying voters' judgments. Assuming that voters share a preference for true collective judgments, we analyze the resulting strategic incentives and determine which voting rules efficiently use all private information. We find that in certain, but not all cases a quota rule should be used, which decides on each issue according to whether the proportion of ‘yes’ votes exceeds a particular quota.

Keywords: Judgment aggregation; Private information; Efficient information aggregation; Strategic voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D70 D71 D80 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Judgment aggregation in search for the truth (2014)
Working Paper: Judgment aggregation in search for the truth (2014)
Working Paper: Judgment aggregation in search for the truth (2014)
Working Paper: Judgement Aggregation in Search for the Truth (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:87:y:2014:i:c:p:571-590

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.02.007

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