Symmetric zero-sum games with only asymmetric equilibria

Dimitrios Xefteris

Games and Economic Behavior, 2015, vol. 89, issue C, 122-125

Abstract: We know that a) two-player symmetric zero-sum games with non-empty equilibrium sets always admit symmetric equilibria and that b) two-player and multiplayer symmetric non-zero-sum games might have only asymmetric equilibria (Fey, 2012). But what about multiplayer symmetric zero-sum games? This paper shows that these games might also have only asymmetric equilibria. One of the examples employed to illustrate this point is the three-candidate version of the popular Hotelling–Downs model of electoral competition. This demonstrates that symmetric games with only asymmetric equilibria are not technical paradoxes but are integrated in economics and political science literature for quite a while.

Keywords: Symmetric game; Symmetric equilibrium; Zero-sum game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825614001675
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:89:y:2015:i:c:p:122-125

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.12.001

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().