Priority matchings revisited

Yasunori Okumura

Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, vol. 88, issue C, 242-249

Abstract: We consider a pairwise kidney exchange model. Roth et al. (2005) define priority matchings of the model and introduce a mechanism to derive them. In this paper, we re-examine the priority matching. First, we consider a general priority ordering where multiple patients may hold equal priority. We provide a characterization of the priority matchings by using the concept of alternating paths. Using the characterization, we examine the effect of a small change in the priority order on a set of priority matchings. Moreover, we provide an efficient method to find a priority matching.

Keywords: Matching; Pairwise kidney exchange problem; Roommate problem; Priority mechanism; Polynomial-time algorithm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 C78 D02 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:88:y:2014:i:c:p:242-249

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.10.007

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