Sequential cheap talks
Games and Economic Behavior, 2015, vol. 90, issue C, 128-133
In this note, we analyze a multidimensional cheap talk game where two senders sequentially submit messages. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a fully-revealing equilibrium.
Keywords: Multidimensional cheap talk; Sequential messages (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:90:y:2015:i:c:p:128-133
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