Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals

Juan Ortner

Games and Economic Behavior, 2015, vol. 90, issue C, 1-16

Abstract: I consider a standard implementation problem under complete information when agents have a minimal degree of honesty. In particular, I assume that agents are white lie averse: they strictly prefer to tell the truth whenever lying has no effect on their material payoff. I show that if there are at least five agents who are all white lie averse and if I impose either of two refinements of Nash equilibrium, then a simple direct mechanism fully implements any social choice function.

Keywords: Implementation; Mechanism design; White lie aversion; Direct mechanisms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Direct Implementation with Minimally Honest Individuals (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:90:y:2015:i:c:p:1-16

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.01.002

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