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Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games

Francis Bloch and Anne van den Nouweland

Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, vol. 88, issue C, 339-353

Abstract: This paper proposes axiomatic foundations of expectation formation rules, by which deviating players anticipate the reaction of external players in a partition function game. The projection rule is the only rule satisfying subset consistency and responsiveness to the original partition of non-deviating players. It is also the only rule satisfying subset consistency, independence of the original partition of deviating players, and coherence of expectations. Exogenous rules are the only rules satisfying subset consistency and independence of the original partition, and the pessimistic rule is the only rule generating superadditive coalitional games.

Keywords: Partition function games; Core; Expectation formation; Axiomatization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (37)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games (2014)
Working Paper: Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games (2014)
Working Paper: Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:88:y:2014:i:c:p:339-353

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.10.012

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