Recall and private monitoring

Christopher Phelan and Andrzej Skrzypacz

Games and Economic Behavior, 2015, vol. 90, issue C, 162-170

Abstract: For a general class of games with private monitoring we show for any finite state strategy (or automaton strategy) with Di states for players i∈{1,…,N}, if there exists a number of periods t such that it is possible on-path to reach any joint state from any joint state in t periods, the strategy is a strict correlated equilibrium only if each player's strategy is a function only of what the player observes in the last Di−1 periods.

Keywords: Repeated games; Private monitoring (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:90:y:2015:i:c:p:162-170

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.010

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