Implementation in economies with non-convex production technologies unknown to the designer

Guoqiang Tian

Games and Economic Behavior, 2009, vol. 66, issue 1, 526-545

Abstract: This paper deals with the problem of incentive mechanism design in non-convex production economies when production sets and preferences both are unknown to the designer. We consider Nash-implementation of loss-free, average cost, marginal cost, voluntary trading, and quantity-taking pricing equilibrium allocations in economies involving increasing returns to scale or more general types of non-convexities. The mechanisms presented in the paper are well-behaved. They are feasible, continuous, and use finite dimensional message spaces. Moreover, the mechanisms work not only for three or more agents, but also for two-agent economies.

Keywords: Incentive; mechanism; design; Implementation; Various; pricing; equilibrium; principles; Increasing; returns; Well-behaved; mechanism; design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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