Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities

László Kóczy ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2009, vol. 66, issue 1, 559-565

Abstract: The sequential coalition formation model of Bloch to solve cooperative games with externalities exhibits some anomalies when related to classical concepts [Bloch, F., 1996. Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division. Games Econ. Behav. 14, 90-123]. We elaborate on these problems, define a modification of Bloch's model and show that its order-independent equilibria coincide with the (pessimistic) recursive core [Kóczy, L.Á., 2007. A recursive core for partition function form games. Theory Dec. 63, 41-51].

Keywords: Core; Externalities; Sequential; coalition; formation; Order-independent; equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899-8256(08)00084-5
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:66:y:2009:i:1:p:559-565

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().