Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations

Francis Bloch and Bhaskar Dutta

Games and Economic Behavior, 2009, vol. 66, issue 2, 721-728

Abstract: This paper proposes new concepts of strong and coalition-proof correlated equilibria where agents form coalitions at the interim stage and share information about their recommendations in a credible way. When players deviate at the interim stage, coalition-proof correlated equilibria may fail to exist for two-player games. However, coalition-proof correlated equilibria always exist in dominance-solvable games and in games with positive externalities and binary actions.

Keywords: Correlated; equilibrium; Coalitions; Information; sharing; Games; with; positive; externalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Correlated Equilibria, Incomplete Information and Coalitional Deviations (2006)
Working Paper: Correlated Equilibria, Incomplete Information and Coalitional Deviations (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:66:y:2009:i:2:p:721-728

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