Correlated Equilibria, Incomplete Information and Coalitional Deviations

Francis Bloch and Bhaskar Dutta

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper proposes new concepts of strong and coalition-proof correlated equilibria where agents form coalitions at the interim stage and share information about their recommendations in a credible way. When players deviate at the interim stage, coalition-proof correlated equilibria may fail to exist for two-player games. However, coalition- proof correlated equilibria always exist in dominance-solvable games and in games with positive externalities and binary actions.

Keywords: correlated equilibrium; coalitions; information sharing; games with positive externalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/w ... s/2006/twerp_763.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations (2009)
Working Paper: Correlated Equilibria, Incomplete Information and Coalitional Deviations (2006)
Working Paper: Correlated Equilibria, Incomplete Information and Coalitional Deviations (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:763

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