Correlated Equilibria, Incomplete Information and Coalitional Deviations

Francis Bloch and Bhaskar Dutta

No 269733, Economic Research Papers from University of Warwick - Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper proposes new concepts of strong and coalition-proof correlated equilibria where agents form coalitions at the interim stage and share information about their recommendations in a credible way. When players deviate at the interim stage, coalition-proof correlated equilibria may fail to exist for two-player games. However, coalitionproof correlated equilibria always exist in dominance-solvable games and in games with positive externalities and binary actions.

Keywords: Financial Economics; Research Methods/Statistical Methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25
Date: 2006-06-21
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Related works:
Journal Article: Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations (2009)
Working Paper: Correlated Equilibria, Incomplete Information and Coalitional Deviations (2006)
Working Paper: Correlated Equilibria, Incomplete Information and Coalitional Deviations (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uwarer:269733

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.269733

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