Correlated Equilibria, Incomplete Information and Coalitional Deviations

Francis Bloch and Bhaskar Dutta

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Abstract: This paper proposes new concepts of strong and coalition-proof correlated equilibria where agents form coalitions at the interim stage and share information about their recommendations in a credible way. When players deviate at the interim stage, coalition-proof correlated equilibria may fail to exist for two-player games. However, coalitionproof correlated equilibria always exist in dominance-solvable games and in games with positive externalities and binary actions.

Keywords: correlated equilibrium; coalitions; information sharing; games with positive externalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00410457v1
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Related works:
Journal Article: Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations (2009)
Working Paper: Correlated Equilibria, Incomplete Information and Coalitional Deviations (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00410457

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