On the existence of Bayesian Cournot equilibrium

Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko (), Diego Moreno () and Benyamin Shitovitz

Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, vol. 68, issue 1, 77-94

Abstract: We show that when firms have incomplete information about the market demand and their costs, a (Bayesian) Cournot equilibrium in pure strategies may not exist, or be unique. In fact, we are able to construct surprisingly simple and robust examples of duopolies with these features. However, we also find some sufficient conditions for existence, and for uniqueness, of Cournot equilibrium in a certain class of industries. More general results arise when negative prices are possible.

Keywords: Oligopoly; Incomplete; information; Bayesian; Cournot; Equilibrium; Existence; Uniqueness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Related works:
Working Paper: On the Existence of Bayesian Cournot Equilibrium (2008)
Working Paper: On the Existence of Bayesian Cournot Equilibrium (2007)
Working Paper: On the Existence of Bayesian Cournot Equilibrium (2007)
Working Paper: On the existence of Bayesian Cournot equilibrium (2007)
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