On the Existence of Bayesian Cournot Equilibrium
Ezra Einy (),
Diego Moreno () and
Benyamin Shitovitz ()
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Ezra Einy: Department of Economics Ben-Gurion University, Israel
Benyamin Shitovitz: Department of Economics, University of Haifa, Israel
No 715, Working Papers from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics
We show that when firms have asymmetric information about the market demand and theirs costs, a (Bayesian) Cournot equilibrium in pure strategies may not exist, or be unique. In fact, we are able to construct surprisingly simple and robust examples of duopolies with these features. However, we also find sufficient conditions for existence, and for uniqueness, of Cournot equilibrium in a certain class of industries. More general results arise when negative prices are possible.
Keywords: Oligopoly; Incomplete Information; Bayesian; Cournot; Equilibrium; Existence; Uniqueness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
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Journal Article: On the existence of Bayesian Cournot equilibrium (2010)
Working Paper: On the Existence of Bayesian Cournot Equilibrium (2008)
Working Paper: On the Existence of Bayesian Cournot Equilibrium (2007)
Working Paper: On the existence of Bayesian Cournot equilibrium (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bgu:wpaper:0715
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