On the existence of Bayesian Cournot equilibrium

Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko () and Benyamin Shitovitz
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Diego Moreno ()

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: We show that even in very simple oligopolies with differential information a (Bayesian) Cournot equilibrium in pure strategies may not exist, or be unique. However, we find sufficient conditions for existence, and for uniqueness, of Cournot equilibrium in a certain class of industries. More general results arise when negative prices are allowed.

Keywords: Oligopoly; Incomplete; information; Bayesian; Cournot; Equilibrium; Existence; Uniqueness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: On the existence of Bayesian Cournot equilibrium (2010)
Working Paper: On the Existence of Bayesian Cournot Equilibrium (2008)
Working Paper: On the Existence of Bayesian Cournot Equilibrium (2007)
Working Paper: On the Existence of Bayesian Cournot Equilibrium (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we070603

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