House allocation with existing tenants: A characterization

Tayfun Sönmez and Utku Unver

Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, vol. 69, issue 2, 425-445

Abstract: We analyze mechanisms that are used to allocate dormitory rooms to students at college campuses. Students consist of newcoming freshmen, who do not currently occupy any rooms, and more senior students each of whom occupies a room from the previous year. In addition to the rooms already occupied by the existing tenants, there are vacated rooms by the graduating class. Students have strict preferences over dormitory rooms. Each student shall be assigned a dormitory room in an environment where monetary transfers are not allowed. An existing tenant can move to another room as a result of the assignment. We show that you request my house-I get your turn mechanisms are the only mechanisms that are Pareto-efficient, individually rational, strategy-proof, weakly neutral, and consistent.

Keywords: House; allocation; Matching; Strategy-proofness; Consistency; Individual; rationality; Pareto; efficiency; Neutrality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (39)

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