Flexible network rules for identified externalities

Noemí Navarro

Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, vol. 69, issue 2, 401-410

Abstract: I propose three modifications of Jackson's flexible network axiom (Jackson, 2005) when the structure of externalities across components have been identified. The first one takes into account the information about the externalities across components. The second one allows for coalitional deviations once the network has been formed. Finally, the third one tries to find a compromise with component efficiency (Myerson, 1977a).

Keywords: Allocation; rules; Networks; Player-based; flexible; network; allocation; rule; Myerson; value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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