Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply - experimental evidence

Damian Damianov, Jörg Oechssler and Johannes Gerd Becker

Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, vol. 68, issue 1, 60-76

Abstract: In the variable supply auction considered here, the seller decides how many customers with unit demand to serve after observing their bids. Bidders are uncertain about the seller's cost. We experimentally investigate whether a uniform or a discriminatory price auction is better for the seller in this setting. Exactly as predicted by theory, it turns out that the uniform price auction produces substantially higher bids, and consequently yields higher revenues and profits for the seller. Furthermore, again as predicted by theory, the uniform price auction yields a higher number of transactions, which makes it also the more efficient auction format.

Keywords: Auctions; Experiment; Discriminatory; Uniform (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Working Paper: Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply: experimental evidence (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:68:y:2010:i:1:p:60-76

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