Cognitive forward induction and coordination without common knowledge: An experimental study
Andreas Blume and
Uri Gneezy
Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, vol. 68, issue 2, 488-511
Abstract:
This paper investigates optimal play in coordination games in which cognition plays an important role. In our game logically omniscient players would be able to identify a distinct coordination opportunity from other obvious facts. Real players may be unable to make the required inference. Our main experimental results are that in a coordination task with a cognitive component (1) players play differently when playing against themselves rather than against another player, and (2) given the opportunity, players signal cognition by choosing the coordination task over an outside option, a phenomenon which we refer to as cognitive forward induction.
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:68:y:2010:i:2:p:488-511
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