Partial exposure in large games

Ronen Gradwohl and Omer Reingold

Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, vol. 68, issue 2, 602-613

Abstract: In this work we introduce the notion of partial exposure, in which the players of a simultaneous-move Bayesian game are exposed to the realized types and chosen actions of a subset of the other players. We show that in any large simultaneous-move game, each player has very little regret even after being partially exposed to other players. If players are given the opportunity to be exposed to others at the expense of a small decrease in utility, players will decline this opportunity, and the original Nash equilibria of the game will survive.

Keywords: Noncooperative; games; Large; games; Nash; equilibrium; Ex; post; Nash (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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