Costly network formation and regular equilibria

Francesco De Sinopoli and Carlos Pimienta ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, vol. 69, issue 2, 492-497

Abstract: We prove that for generic network-formation games where players incur a strictly positive cost to propose links the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all Nash equilibria are regular and, therefore, stable sets.

Keywords: Network-formation; games; Regular; equilibrium; Stable; sets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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