Minority voting and long-term decisions

Theresa Fahrenberger and Hans Gersbach

Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, vol. 69, issue 2, 329-345

Abstract: In this paper we propose minority voting as a scheme that can partially protect individuals from the risk of repeated exploitation. We consider a committee that meets twice to decide about projects including a first-period project that may have long-lasting impact. In the first period, a simple open majority voting scheme takes place. Voting splits the committee into three groups: voting winners, voting losers, and absentees. Under minority voting, only voting losers retain their voting rights in the second period. We show that as soon as absolute risk aversion exceeds a threshold value, minority voting is superior to repeated application of the simple majority rule.

Keywords: Voting; Minority; Durable; decision; Risk; aversion; Tyranny; of; majority; rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Minority Voting and Long-term Decisions (2008)
Working Paper: Minority Voting and Long-term Decisions (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:69:y:2010:i:2:p:329-345

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