Simple complexity from imitation games

Andrew McLennan () and Rabee Tourky

Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, vol. 68, issue 2, 683-688

Abstract: We give simple proofs of refinements of the complexity results of Gilboa and Zemel (1989), and we derive additional results of this sort. Our constructions employ imitation games, which are two person games in which both players have the same sets of pure strategies and the second player wishes to play the same pure strategy as the first player.

Keywords: Imitation; games; Symmetric; games; Symmetric; Nash; equilibria; Quadratic; programming; Stationary; points; Complexity; NASH (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:68:y:2010:i:2:p:683-688

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