Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem
Youngsub Chun and
Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 102, issue C, 462-476
We investigate the implications of welfare lower bounds together with queue-efficiency and strategy-proofness in the context of the queueing problem. First, we introduce the k-welfare lower bound, which requires that each agent should be guaranteed her utility at the kth queue position with zero transfer. For each k, we show that the k-pivotal rules (Mitra and Mutuswami, 2011) achieve the minimal deficit in each problem among all rules satisfying queue-efficiency, strategy-proofness, and the k-welfare lower bound. Next, we consider the identical costs lower bound, which is a counterpart of the identical preferences lower bound in our context, and show that when there is an odd number of agents, the k-pivotal rules with k=n+12 achieve the minimal deficit in each problem among all rules satisfying queue-efficiency, strategy-proofness, and the identical costs lower bound. Our results provide an alternative justification for the k-pivotal rules.
Keywords: Queueing problem; Queue-efficiency; Strategy-proofness; k-Pivotal rules; k-Welfare lower bound; Identical costs lower bound (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D63 D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:102:y:2017:i:c:p:462-476
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