Sincere voting in large elections

Avidit Acharya () and Adam Meirowitz

Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 101, issue C, 121-131

Abstract: Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) showed that sincere/informative voting is not typically an equilibrium of the Condorcet voting model when the size of the electorate is large. Here, we reverse their finding by adding a third type of voter—one that receives no information in favor of either of the alternatives—as well as global uncertainty about the probability that each voter is such a “no evidence type.” The expected number of no evidence type voters can be arbitrarily small; nevertheless, if the electorate is large enough, then each of the two standard Condorcet types votes sincerely in every nondegenerate type-symmetric equilibrium.

Keywords: Informative voting; Sincere voting; Strategic voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:101:y:2017:i:c:p:121-131

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.010

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