Unanimous rules in the laboratory

Laurent Bouton, Aniol Llorente-Saguer and Frederic Malherbe

Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 102, issue C, 179-198

Abstract: We study the information aggregation properties of unanimous voting rules in the laboratory. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that majority rule with veto power dominates unanimity rule. We also find that the strategic voting model is a fairly good predictor of subject behavior. Finally, we exploit a framing effect to study how the presence of less sophisticated agents affects Veto's welfare properties.

Keywords: Unanimity rule; Veto power; Constructive abstention; Information aggregation; Laboratory experiments; Framing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Unanimous Rules in the Laboratory (2016)
Working Paper: Unanimous Rules in the Laboratory (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:102:y:2017:i:c:p:179-198

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.12.001

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