Unanimous Rules in the Laboratory

Laurent Bouton, Aniol Llorente-Saguer and Frederic Malherbe

No 21943, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study the information aggregation properties of unanimous voting rules in the laboratory. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that majority rule with veto power dominates unanimity rule. We also find that the strategic voting model is a fairly good predictor of observed subject behavior. There are, however, cases where organizing the data seems to require a mix of strategic and sincere voting. This pattern of behavior would imply that the way majority rule with veto power is framed may significantly affect the outcome of the vote. Our data strongly supports such an hypothesis.

JEL-codes: C92 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-pol
Note: POL
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published as Bouton, Laurent & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Malherbe, Frédéric, 2017. "Unanimous rules in the laboratory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 179-198.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w21943.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Unanimous rules in the laboratory (2017)
Working Paper: Unanimous Rules in the Laboratory (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21943

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w21943

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().