Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: Experimental evidence

Wolfgang Luhan, Anders U. Poulsen and Michael W.M. Roos

Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 102, issue C, 687-699

Abstract: We conduct a bargaining experiment where interaction is tacit and payoffs are earned and cumulated in real time. We test hypotheses about the interaction between the focal properties of payoffs and the complexity of coordinating on an intertemporal behavior that achieves them. The general finding is that when a payoff focal outcome requires a complicated coordination scheme bargainers tend to settle on a simpler and sometimes inefficient behavior.

Keywords: Bargaining; Payoff focality; Coordination complexity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:102:y:2017:i:c:p:687-699

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.016

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