Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching

Federico Echenique and Alfred Galichon

Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 101, issue C, 63-77

Abstract: We characterize solutions for two-sided matching, both in the transferable- and in the nontransferable-utility frameworks, using a cardinal formulation. Our approach makes the comparison of the matching models with and without transfers particularly transparent. We introduce the concept of a no-trade stable matching to study the role of transfers in matching. A no-trade stable matching is one in which the availability of transfers does not affect the outcome.

Keywords: Market design; Matching theory; National resident matching program (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825615001323
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching (2021)
Working Paper: Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching (2017)
Working Paper: Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching (2017)
Working Paper: Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching (2014)
Working Paper: Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:101:y:2017:i:c:p:63-77

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.002

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().