Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching

Federico Echenique and Alfred Galichon

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Abstract: We characterize solutions for two-sided matching, both in the transferable and in the nontransferable-utility frameworks, using a cardinal formulation. Our approach makes the comparison of the matching models with and without transfers particularly transparent. We introduce the concept of a no-trade matching to study the role of transfers in matching. A no-trade matching is one in which the availability of transfers do not affect the outcome.

Date: 2021-02, Revised 2021-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-upt
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Published in Games and Economic Behavior 101 (2017) pp. 63-77

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Related works:
Journal Article: Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching (2017)
Working Paper: Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching (2017)
Working Paper: Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching (2017)
Working Paper: Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching (2014)
Working Paper: Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching (2014)
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