Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching

Federico Echenique and Alfred Galichon ()
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Alfred Galichon: ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We characterize solutions for two-sided matching, both in the transferable- and in the nontransferable-utility frameworks, using a cardinal formulation. Our approach makes the comparison of the matching models with and without transfers particularly transparent. We introduce the concept of a no-trade stable matching to study the role of transfers in matching. A no-trade stable matching is one in which the availability of transfers does not affect the outcome.

Keywords: market design; matching theory; national resident matching program (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-01
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Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, 101, pp.63 - 77. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.002⟩

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Related works:
Working Paper: Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching (2021)
Journal Article: Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching (2017)
Working Paper: Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching (2017)
Working Paper: Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching (2014)
Working Paper: Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03261595

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.002

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