Fostering cooperation through the enhancement of own vulnerability

Anita Kopányi-Peuker, Theo Offerman and Randolph Sloof

Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 101, issue C, 273-290

Abstract: We consider the possibility that cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma is fostered by people's voluntary enhancement of their own vulnerability. The vulnerability of a player determines the effectiveness of possible punishment by the other. In the “Gradual” mechanism, players may condition their incremental enhancements of their vulnerability on the other's choices. In the “Leap” mechanism, they unconditionally choose their vulnerability. In our experiment, subjects only learn to cooperate when either one of these mechanisms is allowed. In agreement with theory, subjects aiming for cooperation choose higher vulnerability levels in Gradual than in Leap, which maps into higher mutual cooperation levels.

Keywords: Prisoner's dilemma; Cooperation; Endogenous punishment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D81 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Fostering Cooperation through the Enhancement of Own Vulnerability (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:101:y:2017:i:c:p:273-290

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.001

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