Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules
Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 102, issue C, 138-146
I analyze Nash implementation when agents might use an exogenous tie-breaking rule to choose among the messages they are materially indifferent between. If the planner is endowed with the knowledge of the rule, this might expand or shrink the set of implementable social choice correspondences depending on the particular rule used by the agents. If the planner is not endowed with the knowledge of the rule, then the problem of implementation is almost equivalent to double implementation in Nash and strict Nash equilibrium.
Keywords: Nash implementation; Behavioral mechanism design; Double implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D01 D70 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:102:y:2017:i:c:p:138-146
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