The Blocking Lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings

Zhenhua Jiao and Guoqiang Tian

Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 102, issue C, 44-55

Abstract: This paper considers the incentive compatibility in many-to-many two-sided matching problems. We first show that the Blocking Lemma holds for many-to-many matchings under the extended max–min preference criterion and quota-saturability condition. This result extends the Blocking Lemma for one-to-one matching and for many-to-one matching to many-to-many matching problem. It is then shown that the deferred acceptance mechanism is strategy-proof for agents on the proposing side under the extended max–min preference criterion and quota-saturability condition. Neither the Blocking Lemma nor the incentive compatibility can be guaranteed if the preference condition is weaker than the extended max–min criterion.

Keywords: Many-to-many matching; Blocking Lemma; Max–min preferences; Deferred acceptance algorithm; Strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:102:y:2017:i:c:p:44-55

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.015

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