The management of innovation: Experimental evidence

David Kusterer and Patrick Schmitz

Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 104, issue C, 706-725

Abstract: We report data from a laboratory experiment with 576 participants that was designed to test Aghion and Tirole's (1994a) management of innovation theory which is based on the Grossman–Hart–Moore property rights approach. A research unit and a customer can invest to increase the probability of making an innovation. When the innovation is made, the parties bargain over the division of the revenue. In line with the theoretical predictions, we find that ownership matters for the division of the revenue and the investments. However, communication can mitigate Aghion and Tirole's (1994a) concern that the customer will not relinquish ownership to the cash-constrained research unit.

Keywords: Property rights; Incomplete contracts; Investment incentives; Laboratory experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D23 D86 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: The Management of Innovation: Experimental Evidence (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:706-725

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.011

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