Perception games and privacy

Ronen Gradwohl and Rann Smorodinsky

Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 104, issue C, 293-308

Abstract: Players have privacy concerns that may affect their choice of actions in strategic settings. We use a variant of signaling games to model this effect and study its relation to pooling behavior, misrepresentation of information, and inefficiency.

Keywords: Privacy; Perception games; Signaling games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:293-308

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.006

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