The curse of the first-in–first-out queue discipline

Trine Platz and Lars Peter Østerdal

Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 104, issue C, 165-176

Abstract: We consider a game in which a large number of identical agents choose when to queue up at a single server after it opens. Agents are impatient for service and also incur a cost proportional to time spent in the queue. We show that the first-in–first-out queue discipline and the last-in–first-out queue discipline both lead to a unique equilibrium arrival distribution. However, among all work-conserving queue disciplines, the first-in–first-out performs the worst in terms of equilibrium utility and welfare, while the last-in–first-out performs the best.

Keywords: Queue discipline; Nash equilibrium; FIFO; LIFO; Welfare; Congestion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D62 R41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The curse of the first-in-first-out queue discipline (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:165-176

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.004

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