Every random choice rule is backwards-induction rationalizable

Jiangtao Li and Rui Tang

Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 104, issue C, 563-567

Abstract: Motivated by the literature on random choice and in particular the random utility models, we extend the analysis in Bossert and Sprumont (2013) to include the possibility that players exhibit stochastic preferences over alternatives. We prove that every random choice rule is backwards-induction rationalizable.

Keywords: Revealed preference; Backwards-induction; Rationalizability; Random choice; Stochastic preference (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:563-567

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.003

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