Some further properties of the cumulative offer process
Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 104, issue C, 656-665
We investigate extension/resource monotonicity and respecting improvements properties of the cumulative offer process (COP). Extension monotonicity says that no doctor is to be better off whenever others start preferring more contracts to being unmatched. Resource monotonicity, on the other hand, requires that no doctor becomes worse off whenever hospitals start hiring more doctors. The COP becomes extension and resource monotonic whenever contracts are unilateral substitutes (US) satisfying an irrelevance of rejected contracts condition (IRC). This result implies that the COP is population monotonic under US and the IRC. We then turn to the respecting improvements property, which states that no doctor should be harmed if some of his contracts become more popular. With an additional law of aggregate demand condition, we show that the COP respects improvements.
Keywords: Extension monotonicity; Resource monotonicity; Population monotonicity; Respecting improvements; The cumulative offer process; Matching with contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D44 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:656-665
Access Statistics for this article
Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai
More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().