Reaching consensus through approval bargaining

Jean-François Laslier, Matias Nuñez and Carlos Pimienta ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 104, issue C, 241-251

Abstract: In the Approval Bargaining game, two players bargain over a finite set of alternatives. To this end, each one simultaneously submits a utility function u jointly with a real number α; by doing so she approves the lotteries whose expected utility according to u is at least α. The lottery to be implemented is randomly selected among the most approved ones. We first prove that there is an equilibrium where players truthfully reveal their utility function. We also show that, in any equilibrium, the equilibrium outcome is approved by both players. Finally, every equilibrium is sincere and Pareto efficient as long as both players are partially honest.

Keywords: Approval voting; Bargaining; Partial honesty; Consensual equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:241-251

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.002

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